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The TLS Internet Standard, previously known as SSL, is the 
default protocol for encrypting communications between 
clients and servers on the Web. Hence, TLS routinely pro-
tects our sensitive emails, health records, and payment in-
formation against network-based eavesdropping and 
tampering. For the last 20 years, the security of TLS has 
been analyzed in a variety of cryptographic and program-
ming models, in order to establish strong formal guaran-
tees for various configurations of the protocol. Yet, TLS 
deployments are still often found to be vulnerable to at-
tacks, and still rely on security experts to fix the protocol 
implementations. 
The miTLS project intends to solve this apparent contra-
diction between published proofs and real-world attacks, 
which reveals a gap between the theory and practice of 
TLS.  To this end, we jointly develop a verified reference 
implementation and a cryptographic security proof that 
account for the low-level details of the protocol.  The re-
sulting formal development sheds light on recent attacks, 
yields security guarantees for typical usages of TLS, and 
informs the design of the next version of the protocol. 
D.4.6.c Cryptographic controls < D.4.6 Security and Pri-
vacy Protection < D.4 Operating Systems < D Soft-
ware/Software Engineering,  
D.2.4.d Formal methods < D.2.4 Software/Program Veri-
fication < D.2 Software Engineering < D Software/Soft-
ware Engineering 
Both the Internet and cryptography took roots in military 
technology.  One of the first uses of computers, pio-
neered by Alan Turing, was to decrypt German war-time 
communications; and the precursor of the Internet, the 
Arpanet, was designed for resilience in case of nuclear 
war. It was the invention of public-key cryptography by 
Diffie and Hellman that created the impetus for open ac-
ademic research into cryptography, and eventually led to 
the ubiquitous use of encryption on the Internet. 
The Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol, one of the first 
real-world deployments of public-key cryptography, was 
originally developed by Netscape, an early Internet 
browser vendor, to provide secure channels for elec-
tronic commerce. One of its main designers was Elgamal, 
a student of Hellman.  As SSL took over the Web, it was 
renamed Transport Layer Security (TLS) and documented 
as an open standard by the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF). Over time, it has undergone major changes; 
its implementations currently feature five versions—
SSL2, SSL3, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1.2—while the next 
version of the protocol is actively being discussed at the 
IETF. 
TLS implements a network socket API on top of a reliable 
but insecure network. It consists of two main protocols: a 
handshake that establishes sessions between clients and 
servers, relying on public-key cryptography to compute 
shared session keys; and a record layer that uses those 
keys to encrypt and authenticate their communications. 
SSL2 initially supported a single handshake scheme, 
based on RSA encryption, and a few record encryption al-
gorithms, such as RC2 and DES.  SSL3 added Diffie-Hell-
man schemes to the handshake, and further encryption 
algorithms, such as RC4 and 3DES. Over time, many of 
these cryptographic constructions came under attack, 
and were supplemented with stronger alternatives.  
Since the client and the server may support different sets 
of cryptographic algorithms, the handshake lets them ne-
gotiate a combination of algorithms, called a ciphersuite.  
Hence, any TLS client and server can inter-operate as long 
as they have at least one ciphersuite in common. Over 
time, the number of ciphersuites supported by TLS imple-
mentations has grown steadily.  For example, the popular 
OpenSSL library now supports over a hundred cipher-
suites.  
Not all ciphersuites are equally strong.  Like most com-
mercial software during the cold war, SSL was subject to 
US export regulations that classified cryptography as a 
weapon.  To comply with these regulations, all protocol 
versions up to TLS 1.0 included deliberately weakened 
encryption algorithms for use in US software, such as web 
browsers, exported to foreign countries.  Cryptographers 
and security practitioners started a rebellion, dubbed the 
Crypto Wars1, against this weakening of their work, and 
eventually prevailed, but SSL and TLS implementations 
were still forced to support export-grade ciphersuites for 
interoperability. 
Many of the challenges in designing and deploying TLS se-
curely were already apparent in the early days of the pro-
tocol. In particular, Bleichenbacher demonstrated a side-
channel attack against the way RSA encryption was used 
in the SSL handshake, and Vaudenay discovered another 
side-channel attack on the way application data was en-
crypted in the record protocol.2  Later versions of TLS con-
tinued to support those weak constructions, but man-
dated that implementations employ adequate counter-
measures, triggering a series of increasingly sophisticated 
attacks and defences. 
Besides cryptographic weaknesses, the SSL handshake 
protocol itself was shown to be vulnerable to logical 
flaws. The negotiation between strong and weak encryp-
tion had a protocol-level flaw in SSL2: a ciphersuite roll-
back (or downgrade) identified by Abadi3, enabling a net-
work attacker to force a client and a server to use a weak 
export ciphersuite even though they both preferred a 
stronger ciphersuite. This flaw was fixed in SSL3, but a 
subsequent analysis revealed a more advanced down-
grade attack4, enabling a network attacker to first force 
SSL3 clients and servers to use SSL2, and then exploit its 
known weaknesses. This was fixed by modifying the use 
of RSA encryption, which in turn enabled an improved 
Bleichenbacher-style side channel attack. 
Hence, by the early 2000s, TLS was already caught in a 
cycle of attacks and fixes that continues to the current 
day.  Formal foundations, to validate the protocol design 
and prevent any such attacks, became very attractive, 
and researchers from both the cryptographic and formal 
methods communities started applying various verifica-
tion techniques to communications protocols. 
Since the 1980s, cryptographers had been working on 
turning cryptography from an art into a science. The re-
sulting theory is nowadays referred to as provable secu-
rity. Conceived at the Theory of Computation group at 
MIT, it is concerned with reducing the difficulty of break-
ing cryptographic protocols to problems in complexity 
theory and mathematics. This approach resulted in 
ground-breaking works like those by the Turing award 
winners Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali on probabilis-
tic encryption and zero-knowledge proofs. 
From the cryptographer’s point of view, the TLS protocol 
is a combination of standard cryptographic constructions.  
Using compositional provable security techniques, one 
should be able to prove the security of each construction, 
and then put these proofs together to obtain a security 
theorem for TLS.  In reality, composing proofs of various 
ad hoc parts of the protocol turned out to be hard, but 
over the last decade, cryptographers have successfully 
analyzed the security of many popular TLS ciphersuites. 
Their theorems confirm that, under some well-defined 
implementation and mathematical assumptions, the 
cryptographic core of TLS is not vulnerable to attack. 
From the programmer’s point of view, protocols like TLS 
can be viewed as distributed processes that communi-
cate across public channels and use cryptographic primi-
tives as black boxes to protect their messages.  The key 
analysis question is then whether the protocol, seen as a 
program, has logical flaws in its use of communications 
and cryptography, even if one assumes that the crypto-
graphic building blocks are perfectly secure. For example, 
one may ask whether TLS admits ciphersuite or version 
downgrade attacks in the presence of an active network 
adversary. 
The verification of concurrent and distributed processes 
has been investigated in a long line of research on pro-
gramming language semantics, pioneered by other Tu-
ring award winners, Robin Milner and Tony Hoare.  Their 
rigorous mathematical study of the meaning of programs 
allows us to formalize what it means for a program to 
keep a value secret, or for two programs to be equivalent. 
For simple cryptographic primitives, modelled as abstract 
mathematical functions, a message may hide a secret if it 
does not visibly depend on it; and two processes may be 
equivalent if they exchange similar-looking messages.  
Most cryptographic algorithms hide secrets only compu-
tationally, meaning that given sufficient computational 
resources the secret can eventually be recovered. Their 
precise modelling requires complicated probabilistic def-
initions against restricted classes of adversaries. Instead, 
the semantics community proposed simpler symbolic ap-
proximations of cryptography to capture logical flaws, 
and developed tools to prove security (or find attacks) in 
their models.  These techniques were used in a series of 
automated analyses of TLS, showing that the protocol is 
not vulnerable to logical attack, as long as the attacker is 
unable to break the cryptographic primitives. 
Both the provable security and the symbolic verification 
of protocols were successful in their respective academic 
communities. As the former is more precise and the latter 
easier to automate, they are in principle complementary. 
However, the technical differences outlined above led to 
largely separate developments. As we will argue, this lim-
ited the impact that either of them had on the real-world 
security of TLS. 
Theory vs Practice 
Despite these theoretical successes, recent TLS versions 
have still been found vulnerable to practical attacks that 
rely on a combination of implementation bugs, crypto-
graphic weaknesses, and protocol flaws. These attacks 
make it evident that the most advanced models of the 
provable security and verification communities still ig-
nored many important implementation details. Such de-
tails include, for example, message formats, support for 
multiple protocol modes and algorithms for backward 
compatibility, error handling exploitable as side channels, 
and signalling between the protocol and the application. 
Since these details affect the practical security of TLS, 
their omission limits the scope of theoretical statements. 
It is worth reflecting on the cultural reasons for this gap 
between theory and practice. In their 2011 article on 
provable security, Degabriele, Paterson and Watson5 ex-
plain that a focus on principles can lead to simplistic or 
artificial models, and a neglect of implementation details. 
Interestingly, they notice a similar divide in the practical 
security community between specification writers and 
implementers. The former build in flexibility in specifica-
tions to allow for the competing interests of parties con-
tributing to the development process. For example, spec-
ifications often avoid defining an API, and encourage im-
plementations to accept a broad range of behaviours to 
support interoperability and backward compatibility. This 
flexibility can tempt cryptographers to interpret specifi-
cations in an overly abstract way that facilitates security 
analysis but misses real-world attacks that rely on imple-
mentation details. 
Instead, we follow a model-attack-remodel cycle, in-
formed by a dialog between practitioners and theoreti-
cians. Concrete attack scenarios are invaluable for prac-
tice-oriented provable security: if they fall outside the se-
curity model, they encourage researchers to refine their 
model to better account for realistic threats. Conversely, 
model features that do not reflect any such scenario may 
point out simplifications.  
Let us also mention a class of attacks often missed by 
practitioners and theoreticians alike. These attacks target 
the protocol design and evaluation process itself, some-
times directly, through the insertion of backdoors, or, 
more subtly, through influence on the culture in which 
designers operate. Juniper's VPN security hole  is a recent 
example in this class. Besides awareness of the interests 
that some organizations may have in subverting Internet 
security, we believe that formal, open, practice-oriented 
protocol verification helps prevent such attacks.  
A more technical challenge that prevents cryptographic 
analysis techniques to be applied to TLS deployments is 
that the protocol and its implementations have simply 
grown too complicated to be analysed by humans. Unsur-
prisingly, the highly-optimized C code of TLS implementa-
tions such as OpenSSL is amenable neither to crypto-
graphic proofs nor to formal verification.  
Cryptographic and symbolic models of TLS alike could not 
keep up with implementations and did not account for 
the details of the protocol as specified in the standard. 
Consequently, proofs of these models were likely to miss 
practical attacks on the protocol. Of course, they also 
missed attacks that exploited basic implementation 
flaws, such as incorrect certificate validation (GotoFail) or 
buffer overflows (HeartBleed). 
In summary, we argue that the co-existence of proofs and 
attacks can be attributed to multiple gaps between veri-
fied models and real-world protocols: 
I. gaps between cryptographic models and standards;  
II. gaps between standards and implementations; 
III. gaps between individually secure ciphersuites and 
their insecure composition; and  
IV. gaps between APIs and application-level security. 
In the rest of this article, we describe these gaps in more 
detail, and explain how we try to bridge them in the miTLS 
project.  
miTLS: a verified reference  
implementation of TLS 
By 2008, the theory and practice of TLS had largely di-
verged.  To relate high-level specifications and low-level 
implementations (gaps I and II above), a group of re-
searchers at the Microsoft Research-INRIA joint centre in 
Paris (including two authors of this paper) decided to 
build a reference implementation of the TLS 1.0 standard 
(RFC2246) in a style that enabled them to extract a formal 
model of the protocol directly from the code.6 By this ap-
proach, they ensured that the formal model was faithful 
to the standard and captured its low-level details.  The 
model was then analyzed with a state-of-the-art protocol 
verifier, called ProVerif, to find both logical flaws in the 
protocol standard and implementation bugs in their 
code. Inasmuch as ProVerif did not find any flaws, they 
obtained high assurance in the security of their code 
against a large class of attacks. 
This reference implementation, later dubbed miTLS (for 
Microsoft-INRIA TLS), was written in about 4000 lines of 
F# and the extracted symbolic models were among the 
largest to be automatically analyzed at the time, at the 
limits of verification technology. Symbolic tools like 
ProVerif are effective in automatically finding flaws with-
out the need for any user intervention, but they do not 
necessarily scale well to large models.  Verifying their TLS 
implementation for one protocol version and one cipher-
suite took 3.5 hours and 4.5 GB of memory.  Modelling 
other protocol modes was out of reach. Consequently, 
although they were able to find known attacks on early 
versions of SSL, they missed TLS renegotiation or Triple 
handshake attacks that were discovered later, because 
their models did not fully account for renegotiation. 
As discussed above, a limitation of symbolic approaches 
is that they assume that the underlying cryptographic 
building blocks are perfect, and hence miss attacks. Some 
semi-automated tools, such as CryptoVerif, can analyze 
protocols in a more precise computational model of cryp-
tography, but similarly do not scale up to large models. 
They applied CryptoVerif to core fragments of their TLS 
implementation, but were not able to analyze the full 
protocol using this tool. For example, they did not model 
features like compression or the details of Cipher Block 
Chaining, and hence they missed subsequent vulnerabili-
ties like BEAST and CRIME. 
For the next version of miTLS7, we wanted to use a proof 
technique that could handle multiple versions and fea-
tures of the protocol at the same time, and would rely on 
standard computational assumptions for the underlying 
cryptographic constructions. To this end, we switched to 
a verification method based on refinement types (to be 
explained shortly), originally designed for symbolic proto-
col analysis by Bhargavan, Fournet and Gordon,8 and then 
extended to modular computational proofs by Fournet, 
Kohlweiss, and Strub.9 
 
 
Figure 1: miTLS verification architecture 
Refinement types allow programmers to annotate each 
function with logical formulas. These annotations can 
capture program invariants, cryptographic assumptions, 
protocol events, and many security guarantees. To verify 
that a program meets its type annotations, the developer 
runs a type-checker that automatically verifies the pro-
gram with the aid of an external SMT solver to discharge 
logical proof obligations. Crucially, type-checking is com-
positional, in the sense that each function can be inde-
pendently verified, assuming that all previous functions 
also meet their type annotations. Consequently, the time 
for type-checking a large program is more-or-less linear 
in its size, and can be controlled by writing additional in-
termediate annotations.  
The miTLS implementation currently supports TLS 1.0, 
1.1, and 1.2, with multiple handshake and record modes. 
It also fully supports session resumption and renegotia-
tion. The code is written in about 5000 lines of code, and 
is split into a sequence of modules, each of which 
equipped with a refinement-type interface. The verifica-
tion approach is depicted in Figure 1. For modules con-
taining protocol code, the interface represents the target 
security goals we wish to verify. For modules implement-
ing cryptographic primitives, the interface represents the 
idealized functionality of the primitive, according to some 
standard cryptographic security assumption. 
The top-level security guarantees for miTLS are stated in 
terms of a secure channel interface presented by TLS to 
the application.  This interface guarantees that applica-
tion data sent on a connection between a miTLS client 
and a miTLS server is kept confidential, as long as the con-
nection uses strong cryptographic algorithms and the 
long-term private keys of the two peers are unknown to 
the attacker. Moreover, the interface guarantees that the 
stream of application data received at one end is a prefix 
of the stream sent by the other. The security proof relies 
on type-checking each module, after applying a series of 
game-based transformations on the core cryptographic 
modules to replace the concrete algorithms by their ideal 
functionality. By this approach, we are able to verify the 
full miTLS implementation, module by module, under 
precise computational security assumptions.  The total 
time for verification is under 20 minutes. 
While it is valuable to have a security theorem for a ref-
erence implementation of TLS 1.2, the impact of miTLS is 
perhaps better evaluated in terms of the parts of the pro-
tocol design we were unable to prove, or where we had 
to make special cryptographic assumptions. These corner 
cases resulted in the discovery of weaknesses in the pro-
tocol and attacks on its real-world usage, discussed next. 
Application Interface (API) and 
its Security Goals 
Many problems stem from a mismatch between the se-
curity properties expected by applications using TLS and 
the actual guarantees provided by TLS (gap IV).  The TLS 
standard does not specify an application interface (API) 
and so each implementation is free to implement its own.  
Application developers are expected to understand these 
APIs in detail and to use them in the right way to achieve 
their security goals.  For example, some TLS libraries ex-
pect applications to validate the certificate presented by 
the server, and thus developers who wrongly assume that 
the library will do it for them become vulnerable to 
server-impersonation attacks. More generally, many at-
tacks appear when building application-level authentica-
tion on top of TLS. 
Consider an application that uses TLS to establish a secure 
channel where the client is initially unauthenticated. The 
application then runs an authentication protocol on top 
of TLS that allows the user to present a credential to the 
server. In this setting, the client expects that its use of TLS 
guarantees that the credential will only be presented at 
the target server; and a server that receives the creden-
tial over TLS may expect that the user intended to au-
thenticate to it. However, as demonstrated by the attack 
outlined in Figure 2, these expectations are ill placed. We 
follow cryptographic tradition and refer to the client as 
Alice, the server as Bob, and the attacker as Eve. If Alice 
is willing to use the same credential (say, an X.509 certif-
icate) with both Bob and Eve, then Eve can impersonate 
Alice at Bob, by forwarding Alice's credential (say, her sig-
nature over some authentication message) over his own 
channel with Bob. Even if Alice is careful and uses her cre-
dential only with Bob, a sophisticated attacker may im-
personate Bob to mount a Man-in-the-Middle attack 
(MitM), by operating a phishing web-site, obtaining mis-
issued certificates, or compromising the server key.  Such 
credential forwarding attacks can only be prevented if Al-
ice not only authenticates herself, but also her channel, 
e.g., by signing a unique identifier extracted from the TLS 
connection. Then, if Bob compares these channel identi-
fiers he can detect the attack. 
Credential forwarding attacks and their countermeasures 
have appeared multiple times in TLS applications. They 
were first discussed in the context of tunnelled com-
pound authentication protocols for network access. They 
then reappeared in the context of user-authenticated TLS 
renegotiation as commonly used on the web. In response 
to these attacks, a variety of channel identifiers were de-
fined for TLS and exposed within the APIs of various im-
plementations. Compound authentication protocols used 
the TLS session key (called master secret) as an identifier 
for binding application-level credentials. TLS renegotia-
tion used the protocol transcript of the previous hand-
shake as a connection identifier.  
We implemented these countermeasures in miTLS and 
tried to prove that applications using miTLS are not vul-
nerable to credential forwarding, but we failed. Instead, 
we discovered several counterexamples. A malicious 
server is able to synchronize the TLS session keys on two 
different connections, one from Alice and one to Bob, so 
that the channel identifiers on both connections are the 
same, hence defeating the compound authentication 
countermeasure. Then by running a second TLS connec-
tion that uses session resumption, the server can also 
synchronize the protocol transcripts on these connec-
tions, hence defeating the TLS renegotiation counter-
measure. In fact, such channel synchronization attacks 
break all known credential forwarding protections over 
TLS by exploiting a misunderstanding of the TLS API; the 
protocol does not guarantee unique channel identifiers. 
This class of channel syn-
chronization attacks was 
called the Triple Hand-
shake10, since it requires a 
sequence of up to three 
runs of TLS before the at-
tack succeeds against TLS 
client authentication. Alt-
hough it has been present 
in the TLS protocol since 
SSL3, it escaped previous 
analyses because they did 
not consider sequences of 
TLS connections, and they 
did not model credential 
forwarding as a threat. In 
response to these attacks, 
we helped the TLS working 
group to standardize a new protocol-level fix called the 
extended master secret that systematically protects all 
compound authentication protocols.  
 
Implementing Negotiation 
In addition to designing an API, a second major challenge 
for a TLS implementation is that it needs to handle a vari-
ety of protocol versions, extensions, authentication 
modes, and ciphersuites at the same time. While the TLS 
standard describes each mode in isolation, it does not al-
ways specify how an implementation should compose 
them (gap III). In particular, the protocol state machine is 
left unspecified and each implementation can design its 
own. In miTLS, we define and verify our own state ma-
chine. Our type-based proofs rely on careful invariants 
that require that the current protocol state is consistent 
with the desired protocol mode, and that the transcripts 
and signature formats for different modes are disjoint. 
Considering the effort that was required to prove our 
own state machine correct, we then tested other imple-
mentations to see if they implemented the TLS standard 
correctly, and to our surprise, many of them failed this 
test, resulting in subtle attacks.11 
Some implementations failed to correctly implement the 
composition of the handshake and record protocols and 
allowed application data to be sent unencrypted, before 
the handshake was complete. Other implementations 
failed to correctly compose regular RSA ciphersuites with 
export RSA ciphersuites, allowing a downgrade attack, 
called FREAK, whereby a MitM attacker could fool a TLS 
client into accepting export-grade 512-bit RSA keys even 
though it wanted to use regular RSA. In all, by testing 
other open-source TLS libraries against miTLS, we found 
dozens of state machine bugs across all major TLS imple-
mentations, including four that could be exploited for 
real-world attacks. 
 
Figure 2: A compound authentication protocol over TLS. Alice inadvertently establishes a 
secure channel with Eve. If Alice authenticates within the channel a), Eve can forward au-
thentication messages within its own channel with Bob and impersonate Alice. Eve acts as 
a (wo)man in the middle (MiTM) and observes communication Bob deems private. The at-
tack can be prevented if Alice attaches her unique channel identifiers FXRCRLX to the au-
thentication. Bob compares identifiers, detects the MiTM and aborts.     
 
Another attack on TLS negotiation, found by a large group 
of researchers including one of the current authors, relies 
on a protocol flaw rather than an implementation bug.12  
In Logjam, the server supports both regular Diffie-Hell-
man (DH) groups as well as export-grade 512-bit DH 
groups. The client does not support export-grade DH, but 
it allows the server to pick the group. As depicted in Fig-
ure 3, this situation leads to an MitM attack. The attacker 
tampers with the protocol messages to fool the server 
into thinking that the client only supports export-grade 
DH. So, the server sends the export-grade group to the 
client who thinks this is the server's regular group and ac-
cepts it. This kind of attacks is sometimes called a cross-
protocol attack since it involves confusions between two 
different protocols (DH and export DH). It is enabled by a 
protocol flaw in TLS: the server's signature format for ex-
port DH ciphersuites is indistinguishable from its signa-
ture for regular DH. Hence, the attacker can successfully 
downgrade the connection to use export DH even though 
the client does not realize it. To complete the attack, the 
attacker still needs to solve the discrete log problem for 
the export DH group, which is well within reach of mod-
ern processing power. 
Towards TLS 1.3 
At the time when SSL was first designed, there was a real 
enthusiasm and sense of purpose to deploy practical 
cryptographic protocols. Often one and the same person 
worked on and understood both the 
cryptography and the implementa-
tion—to the extent possible at the time. 
Since then, advances in cryptographic 
theory and analysis have greatly im-
proved our understanding of when pro-
tocols achieve their security goals and 
when they fail to do so. However, typi-
cally this analysis is performed either on 
toy protocols, or in retrospect on partial 
aspects of a protocol specification. Im-
plementers still primarily follow a fix-at-
tack-fix cycle. This cycle, however, only 
gets worse as protocols grow in com-
plexity. We believe that the only way 
forward is through an active collaboration between the-
oreticians and practitioners. 
A promising development in this direction is the stand-
ardization effort behind the upcoming TLS 1.3 protocol, 
which fixes many weaknesses in TLS 1.2 and, at the same 
time, promises improved performance. From the early 
stages of its design, the TLS working group has invited and 
encouraged the participation of academic researchers, 
who have responded with significant numbers. Not only 
was the design of the cryptographic core of TLS 1.3 
strongly influenced by the OPTLS protocol by Krawczyk 
and Wee13, but we now have multiple published security 
proofs for different draft versions of the protocol even 
before it has been standardized. Such careful crypto-
graphic analysis for a new standard is unprecedented at 
the IETF.  As a result of this process, many attacks and 
weaknesses were detected and removed from early 
drafts, resulting in a simpler and more secure protocol. 
Our main contribution to the standardization effort is a 
new version of miTLS that implements TLS 1.3, but also 
supports older versions for backwards compatibility. 
Since mainstream TLS implementations will continue to 
support such older versions for the foreseeable future, 
we were especially concerned with the potential for ver-
sion downgrade attacks that might nullify the security ad-
vantages of TLS 1.3.  
TLS 1.3 signs all exchanged messages to 
prevent MitM attacks like Logjam that 
rely on tampering with handshake mes-
sages for downgrade attacks. However, 
we discovered that by downgrading the 
protocol version to TLS 1.2. the attacker 
can force the server to use the weaker 
TLS 1.2 signature that does not cover all 
messages, hence re-enabling such tam-
pering attacks. The problem is that, in 
older versions of TLS, clients cannot ver-
ify the maximum supported server ver-
sion until the end of the protocol, by 
when it is too late.  
 
Figure 3: The Logjam attack. Alice wants to communicate with Bob. Eve tricks 
Bob into starting a DH export protocol. Eve forwards the signature of Bob to 
Alice to get her to use a small prime. Then Eve computes the discrete logarithm 
𝑦 to compute 𝑔𝑥𝑦. Using this secret, she can compute the channel keys to de-
crypt Alice’s messages. 
 
 
Figure 4: The version downgrade countermeasure. Alice tries to establish a 
TLS 1.3 connection with Bob, but Eve changes the maximum client version to 
TLS 1.2 to attempt a version downgrade. The attack can be prevented if Bob 
signs his maximum version. Alice compares Bob’s maximum version with its 
chosen version to detect Eve’s tampering and aborts. 
 
That this downgrade attack went unnoticed until Draft 10 
of TLS 1.3 is an example for the many intricacies and pit-
falls of practical protocol security. Once detected and 
brought to the attention of the IETF, we helped develop 
a verified countermeasure depicted in Figure 4,14 that is 
peculiar but simple: shorten the server nonce, which is 
signed in TLS 1.2, and use some of its bytes to encode the 
server’s highest supported version number.  
The future of verified  
implementations 
The miTLS approach necessarily involves multi-discipli-
nary teams of cryptography, programming semantics, 
tooling and verification experts, as well as generalists 
knowledgeable of real-world security concerns and sys-
tem performance. We require implementations to be 
written in a programming language with a well-define for-
mal semantics so that protocol properties devised by the-
orists can be verified using sound automated tools on 
code co-developed with practitioners. 
Even verified implementations have to rely on crypto-
graphic assumptions, the accuracy of the security model, 
and the correctness of proofs and verification tools. To 
ensure that our modelling assumptions do not miss con-
crete attacks, we advocate a comprehensive penetration 
testing regime that uses the miTLS codebase to find and 
implement attacks on miTLS and other TLS implementa-
tions. Such attacks can be on cryptographic primitives, on 
the TLS protocol level, but also on the HTTPS ecosystem 
and even against the soundness of our verification tools. 
Our goal is to use a combination of verification and test-
ing to span and evaluate all four of these levels in order 
to reduce the trusted computing base for TLS applica-
tions.  
Verification alone is not enough to ensure that a TLS im-
plementation will be widely used. Real-world implemen-
tations have to be performant. A key challenge for future 
work on miTLS is to extend our verification techniques so 
that they can handle the programming idioms used in 
high-performance code. As our tools improve, we antici-
pate that the feature and performance gap between ver-
ified and unverified protocol implementations will vanish.  
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